<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments for Office of the Privacy Commissioner - Deep Packet Inspection</title>
	<atom:link href="http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/comments/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://dpi.priv.gc.ca</link>
	<description>Essays on Deep Packet Inspection</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Fri, 13 May 2011 17:13:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.1.3</generator>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on Deep Packet Inspection: Its Nature and Implications by Deep packet inspection: Its nature and implications &#124; Digitally Mediated Surveillance</title>
		<link>http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/deep-packet-inspection-its-nature-and-implications/comment-page-1/#comment-281</link>
		<dc:creator>Deep packet inspection: Its nature and implications &#124; Digitally Mediated Surveillance</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 May 2011 17:13:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://172.16.1.100:8888/?p=103#comment-281</guid>
		<description>[...] Clarke, Roger. (2009). Deep packet inspection: Its nature and implications. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada Deep Packet Inspection Essays Website. Published March 11, 2009. Retrieved December 10, 2010 from http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/deep-packet-inspection-its-nature-and-implications/ [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Clarke, Roger. (2009). Deep packet inspection: Its nature and implications. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada Deep Packet Inspection Essays Website. Published March 11, 2009. Retrieved December 10, 2010 from <a href="http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/deep-packet-inspection-its-nature-and-implications/" rel="nofollow">http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/deep-packet-inspection-its-nature-and-implications/</a> [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on The Greatest Threat to Privacy by Tyciol</title>
		<link>http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/the-greatest-threat-to-privacy/comment-page-1/#comment-279</link>
		<dc:creator>Tyciol</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Apr 2011 19:37:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://172.16.1.101:8888/?p=27#comment-279</guid>
		<description>Well said, no sniffing plz. No usage based billing either.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well said, no sniffing plz. No usage based billing either.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on DPI can be misused – so can a hammer by Wayne Burkart</title>
		<link>http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/dpi-can-be-misused-so-can-a-hammer/comment-page-1/#comment-268</link>
		<dc:creator>Wayne Burkart</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Dec 2010 16:40:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/?p=258#comment-268</guid>
		<description>One of the items that needs further discussion is the &quot;blacklisting&quot; of IP addresses, by various organizations that aggregate that data for resale to various network and mail system administrators.

Considering most end users utilize a dynamic IP address, they are not able to have the IP address delisted.  Many ISPs resdistribute these blacklisted IPs without having any management program to prevent this from occuring.  In fact a number of ISPs are not even conversant on the issue.  

The implications are quite simple.  Major networks utilize these lists, to shape their traffic accordingly, which puts the unwary end user, in a situation where they are receiving very limited bandwith.  The other result is the practice of a number of large email networks, simply deleting email traffic from a blacklisted IP.  

My experience with a number of national ISPs has me concluding this is a problem they would rather not acknowledge.  While this issue is not specfic to DPI, I believe it is a related issue, as it speaks to tools, and methods used to prevent cyber crime, and its collateral damage.

ISPs play an integral role in ensuring our cyber safety, yet do so within the constraints of their margins.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One of the items that needs further discussion is the &#8220;blacklisting&#8221; of IP addresses, by various organizations that aggregate that data for resale to various network and mail system administrators.</p>
<p>Considering most end users utilize a dynamic IP address, they are not able to have the IP address delisted.  Many ISPs resdistribute these blacklisted IPs without having any management program to prevent this from occuring.  In fact a number of ISPs are not even conversant on the issue.  </p>
<p>The implications are quite simple.  Major networks utilize these lists, to shape their traffic accordingly, which puts the unwary end user, in a situation where they are receiving very limited bandwith.  The other result is the practice of a number of large email networks, simply deleting email traffic from a blacklisted IP.  </p>
<p>My experience with a number of national ISPs has me concluding this is a problem they would rather not acknowledge.  While this issue is not specfic to DPI, I believe it is a related issue, as it speaks to tools, and methods used to prevent cyber crime, and its collateral damage.</p>
<p>ISPs play an integral role in ensuring our cyber safety, yet do so within the constraints of their margins.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on Phorm: A New Paradigm in Internet Advertising by Technology, Thoughts, and Trinkets&#187; Packet Headers and Privacy</title>
		<link>http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/phorm-a-new-paradigm-in-internet-advertising/comment-page-1/#comment-150</link>
		<dc:creator>Technology, Thoughts, and Trinkets&#187; Packet Headers and Privacy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Jun 2010 17:04:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://172.16.1.101:8888/?p=40#comment-150</guid>
		<description>[...] software to shield citizens from threats posed by three-strikes laws, and alter the payload content of data packets for advertising. After touching the payload &#8211; and oftentimes being burned by regulators &#8211; it seems as [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] software to shield citizens from threats posed by three-strikes laws, and alter the payload content of data packets for advertising. After touching the payload &#8211; and oftentimes being burned by regulators &#8211; it seems as [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet Inspection by Global Voices em Português &#187; HADOPI, ACTA, Declaração da Economia Digital: dos Direitos Humanos aos Direitos Econômicos</title>
		<link>http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/the-privacy-implications-of-deep-packet-inspection/comment-page-1/#comment-149</link>
		<dc:creator>Global Voices em Português &#187; HADOPI, ACTA, Declaração da Economia Digital: dos Direitos Humanos aos Direitos Econômicos</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2010 12:15:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://172.16.1.100:8888/?p=68#comment-149</guid>
		<description>[...] The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet Inspection [en], Danielle Keats Citron. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet Inspection [en], Danielle Keats Citron. [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on The Greatest Threat to Privacy by HADOPI-ci, HADOPI-la, Le DPI me fait mal à ma democratie! &#171; IPrivacy4IT &#8211; Clarinette&#39;s blog</title>
		<link>http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/the-greatest-threat-to-privacy/comment-page-1/#comment-147</link>
		<dc:creator>HADOPI-ci, HADOPI-la, Le DPI me fait mal à ma democratie! &#171; IPrivacy4IT &#8211; Clarinette&#39;s blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 May 2010 09:35:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://172.16.1.101:8888/?p=27#comment-147</guid>
		<description>[...] Professeur de Droit Paul Ohm pour qui le DPI représente la plus grande menace à la vie privée. (The &#8216;Greatest Threat to Privacy&#8217; Nous avons outre Manche, l&#8217;exemple de Phorm et Nebuad aux Etats-Unis qui ont fait [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Professeur de Droit Paul Ohm pour qui le DPI représente la plus grande menace à la vie privée. (The &#8216;Greatest Threat to Privacy&#8217; Nous avons outre Manche, l&#8217;exemple de Phorm et Nebuad aux Etats-Unis qui ont fait [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on DPI can be misused – so can a hammer by Chris Lewis</title>
		<link>http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/dpi-can-be-misused-so-can-a-hammer/comment-page-1/#comment-143</link>
		<dc:creator>Chris Lewis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Apr 2010 02:49:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/?p=258#comment-143</guid>
		<description>The reality is that it&#039;s almost exactly the reverse.   Most of the egregious problems we see, DNS redirections, advertising substitution, penalizing certain sites et. al. isn&#039;t done with DPI, it&#039;s done with other far simpler techniques.   Such as QOS, priority management, local DNS substitution and IP and port redirection/blackholing.  Most of which are simple and relatively inexpensive to implement even in very large networks.  DPI requires considerable investment, and the volumes involved are huge. For the most part, the primary incentive for doing it is for automated detection, analysis and blocking malicious packets that either endanger the ISP&#039;s network, or their users, or both.

As I said, these (QOS, DPI, port redirection, DNS redirection) are all just tools.  As a society, we need to decide what these tools should be allowed to do/not do, _not_ which tools are used.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The reality is that it&#8217;s almost exactly the reverse.   Most of the egregious problems we see, DNS redirections, advertising substitution, penalizing certain sites et. al. isn&#8217;t done with DPI, it&#8217;s done with other far simpler techniques.   Such as QOS, priority management, local DNS substitution and IP and port redirection/blackholing.  Most of which are simple and relatively inexpensive to implement even in very large networks.  DPI requires considerable investment, and the volumes involved are huge. For the most part, the primary incentive for doing it is for automated detection, analysis and blocking malicious packets that either endanger the ISP&#8217;s network, or their users, or both.</p>
<p>As I said, these (QOS, DPI, port redirection, DNS redirection) are all just tools.  As a society, we need to decide what these tools should be allowed to do/not do, _not_ which tools are used.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet Inspection by What a week! A weak balance! &#171; IPrivacy4IT &#8211; Clarinette&#39;s blog</title>
		<link>http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/the-privacy-implications-of-deep-packet-inspection/comment-page-1/#comment-138</link>
		<dc:creator>What a week! A weak balance! &#171; IPrivacy4IT &#8211; Clarinette&#39;s blog</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Mar 2010 22:16:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://172.16.1.100:8888/?p=68#comment-138</guid>
		<description>[...] http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/the-privacy-implications-of-deep-packet-inspection/ [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] <a href="http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/the-privacy-implications-of-deep-packet-inspection/" rel="nofollow">http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/the-privacy-implications-of-deep-packet-inspection/</a> [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on The Greatest Threat to Privacy by Tweets that mention The Greatest Threat to Privacy « Office of the Privacy Commissioner – Deep Packet Inspection -- Topsy.com</title>
		<link>http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/the-greatest-threat-to-privacy/comment-page-1/#comment-136</link>
		<dc:creator>Tweets that mention The Greatest Threat to Privacy « Office of the Privacy Commissioner – Deep Packet Inspection -- Topsy.com</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 00:29:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://172.16.1.101:8888/?p=27#comment-136</guid>
		<description>[...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by clarinette, florence meichel, Jan Philipp Albrecht, Stéphane Bortzmeyer, Jérémie Zimmermann and others. Jérémie Zimmermann said: RT @clarinette02Paul Ohm &#039;The Greatest Threat to Privacy&#039; Deep Packet Inspection DPI http://bit.ly/8J8KFc #DPI #privacy [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by clarinette, florence meichel, Jan Philipp Albrecht, Stéphane Bortzmeyer, Jérémie Zimmermann and others. Jérémie Zimmermann said: RT @clarinette02Paul Ohm &#39;The Greatest Threat to Privacy&#39; Deep Packet Inspection DPI <a href="http://bit.ly/8J8KFc" rel="nofollow">http://bit.ly/8J8KFc</a> #DPI #privacy [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on Just Deliver the Packets by Joe Smith</title>
		<link>http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/just-deliver-the-packets/comment-page-1/#comment-135</link>
		<dc:creator>Joe Smith</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Jan 2010 13:30:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://172.16.1.100:8888/?p=71#comment-135</guid>
		<description>Fantastic piece on this issue. When this sort of thing started creeping up along with throttling practices, I contacted the CRTC for remedy. They were unwilling and apparently unable to do anything about it. I am glad that at least some people in Government understand the severity of this issue.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Fantastic piece on this issue. When this sort of thing started creeping up along with throttling practices, I contacted the CRTC for remedy. They were unwilling and apparently unable to do anything about it. I am glad that at least some people in Government understand the severity of this issue.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>

